Many investor groups have called for a Royal Commission into the Australian Financial Marketplace. Although a minority of interests in Need For a Royal Commission touch on a number of instances involving other companies, I am not informed sufficiently informed on each of their histories to comment further. Westpoint is a different story. With the exception of the first two items, the remainder of table items relate to the more glaring Westpoint events that should cause concern to any unbiased reader. The table is by no means exhaustive of events that should give rise to the efficiency of ASIC.
1 |
Since its inception, ASIC's income (exceeding $3 billion), made from the sale of information from its database, far exceeds expenditure. Successive Governments have run ASIC as a profit center, with none of profit invested into achieving better regulation.
- Given ASIC's poor record, it is difficult not to believe making a profit is more important than protecting investors.
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2 |
Perusal of the section Events by Date gives a plethora of instances where ASIC has failed to carry out its assigned duties.
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3 |
Well-known advocate Denise Brailey approached ASIC with concerns about Westpoint issuing mezzanine products via Information Memoranda rather than full prospectuses. ASIC took no action on her warnings, and issued Westpoint with the no-action letter known as the "2000 Freehills letter", which allowed Westpoint to issue products using Promissory Notes.
Given Brailey had broken the Mortgage Broker scandal just before that time, why did they not give her warning more credence?
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4 |
On Channel Ten's David and KIM TV show of 05/05/2007, Denise Brailey claimed in 2001the Queensland ASIC Commissioner, in the presence of high level advisers, told her the Westpointproducts had been issued without a prospectus and people would lose their money.
- If ASIC Queensland ASIC personnel knew this, why did ASIC not take any action to protect investors?
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5 |
According to a document issued by the office of the then Labor Parliamentarian Graham Edwards, the West Australian Government wrote the first of five letters to Treasury/ASIC concerning Westpoint. ASIC did not take action on any of them.
- ASIC, in not disclosing both the contents of the letters and the reasons for not taking action, prevented Westpoint Mezzanine Investors from making informed decisions.
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6 |
ASIC Media Release 04 157 clearly states it believes that the promissory notes were in effect debentures and orders Westpoint to cease issuing them - despite the absence of any document countermanding the no-action_letter_of_2000 as demanded by law.
- Why did ASIC not follow the due legal process before taking action?
- Why was the investing public not informed of the no action letter?
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7 |
ASIC took Westpoint to Court in mid 2004. All of the Westpoint Mezzanine Companies used the same model, and ASIC chose EMU Brewery and Bayshore Mezzanine as the test cases. The judge in the case directed ASIC to write to Westpoint investors in order that they might co-join the action. Ignoring the other 3800 affected investors, ASIC wrote to the 256 investors in the two companies. That document filled several pages with unintelligible legal jargon not understood by investors.
- While it may not have been legally possible for only the investors in the two companies to co-join the case. However, as the outcome of ASIC's action had import for every Westpoint Mezzanine Investor, why did ASIC not write a document, taking no more than two pages, to ALL Westpoint Investors, laying out the main points and their import in simple English?
- Why did ASIC simply refer investors who rang them to contact their planner?
- Mark Stewards claim that ASIC circulated what ASIC was doing and did not hear from any of them is false. The result of the test cases affected all investors, and ASIC only wrote tothe 256 investors of the tet companies. Further, many of the 256 investors ASIC did write to were simply directed to contact their financial planners for advice. In some cases, these planners have now been "outed" by ASIC.
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8 | >
The Judge in the 2004 case of ASIC V Westpoint in adjudicating on the matter of whether the promissory notes were in reality debentures ruled that they were not. He stated they were not, but had ASIC asked him if they were Managed Investment Schemes he would have answered in the affirmative. My legal advice is an MIS does not become illegal until ASIC deems it illegal. However, ASIC made no moves to test the validity of the mezzanine schemes as MIS's, and investors went on to invest very heavily in Westpoint in 2005.
- ASIC are the legal guardians for the market place. How could they have got is so wrong about the nature of the product - particularly when Brailey had warned them before the productsever came on the marketplace?
- Immediately the judge made his comment, why did ASIC not carry out its role of protecting investors, and take immediate action to ensure th products were presented for testing?
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9 |
Carey, in his original submission to the Victoria court, claimed Cooper in, or about September, 2005, rang the CEO of KPMG and told him in words to the effect, "Give Westpoint an absolute workout when auditing the 2004-2005 accounts" [P 33 of Carey V Westpoint ].
- KPMG is a very large, and respected, firm, but why is KPMG allowed to audit accounts if it must be directed in the manner in which it carries out its audits.
- Is it the practice of senior ASIC personnel to contact auditing firms, and give additional directions to statutoryregulations on how they should carry out audits?
- The SMH of 2006_06_13 states the 2004 audit was unqualified and that there were notes on eight of the companies. KPMG would later state those notes raised concerns about the viability of those companies raising public monies.
- Why did ASIC accept unqualified accounts?
- What action did ASIC take on these notes?
- The same article claims KPMG contacted ASIC in early December of 2005 about its concerns. Why has ASIC never mentioned this fact?
With the exception of the 2004 accounts being unqualifified, neither Mark Steward or Jeffrey Lucy evr mention any of the above while under questioning at Senate Estimates Committees. The Senate Estimates hearing of 31/05/2005 is one instance in which they had every opportunity to do so. My question is, did Lucy and Steward commit perjury when they failed to mention any of the above - particularly KPMG's concerns? |
10 |
The following two events of interest took place at the 23/02/2006 ASIC-WIG meeting (see Meetings).
- I asked the then ASIC Chairman, Jeffrey Lucy, had ASIC written to Westpoint investors as directed by the court. He indicated he had no knowledge of the matter, and mention that was the second time he had been asked in the past week (Senator Sherry had asked him the same question at the Senate Estimates Committee Hearing of 16/02/20060. Not knowingthe answer, he took the question on notice). He still did not know the answer at the WIG meeting, nor did he on the 7.30 Report a few hours later.
- Given that Senator Sherry had asked him the question a week previously why had the head of ASIC notbothered to find out the answer to such a simple question? ASIC had written to the 256 investors of Bayshore and Emu brewery.
I asked Ms. Jan Redfern, ASIC's Senior Prosecution Officer, "How, as recorded in the ASIC Media Release 04 157, could ASIC legally demand Westpoint not issue any further promissory based products? ASIC has allowed these products since 2000 without query, and now, without reason, is demanding they cease issuing them?" She answered, "So we could take them to court."
- If ASIC had a valid legal reason for demanding the cessation of the issue of promissory notes, why did Ms. Redfern not give a direct answer? The simple truth is ASIC issued a no action letter to Westpoint in 2000, which was never rescinded.
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11 |
At the Senate Estimates Committee Hearing on 31/05/2006, ASIC's mark Steward claimed ASIC 'cat and moused' with Westpoint lawyers, Freehills, for months.
- Is it ASIC's role to "cat and mouse' with companies, or is its role to enforce the current laws as enacted by parliament?
- Investors can only make informed investment decisions based on the available evidence. ASIC denied investors this opportunity when it did not immediately take action on non compliance with existing laws.
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12 |
Consider the following extracts from the Senate Estimate Committee Hearing of 13/06/2006.
EXTRACT 1
Ms BURKE—There was an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 22 April that ASIC prosecuted less than one per cent of breaches of Corporations Law reported by receivers and trustees in bankruptcy. Do you have a comment on that?Mr Lucy—The difficulty with some of those statistics is that they are fairly unreliable.
Are the folowwing amomg the unreliable people Jeff Lucy was referring to?
-
The Australian of 27/01/2007 states the Auditor General again castigated ASICover their poor prosecution rate per complaint.
National Nine News complained ASIC investigated only 1% of the complaints it received.
SHERRY—It is a mixture of costs and fees; there is a difference. That is not directly your responsibility, except to the extent that a significant minority of moneys went through self-managed super funds into Westpoint. From what I have seen, these people were reasonably well informed in a lot of cases and just did not seem to appreciate what they were getting into.
Mr BAKER—Was there an initial lack of diligence on the part of the auditor KPMG in respect of Westpoint? Can you give us an update?
Mr Lucy—Perhaps you would be kind enough to rephrase the question because I was not quite sure of the context.
Mr BAKER—Where does KPMG sit in this issue? Can you confirm or deny that there was a total, a small amount or an spinitial lack of diligence on their part?
Mr Lucy—We are in a position where we have a very active investigation on foot in relation to Westpoint.We Met your parliamentary colleagues 10 days ago and spoke in some detail about the history of Westpoint. As far as where we go in going forward, we indicated that we are investigating all circumstances dealing with Westpoint, including the role of directors, officers and third parties, including auditors. That is a matter that we are working on. We have it in front of us, but it is not appropriate to go into any particular detail.
- This time, Jeff Lucy has received a direct question on KPMG diligence in its reporting, but once again, even though he is under oath, he does not he does not inform the Senate of the notes on the 004 audit. It also should be remembered it that Lucy's qualifications are in the acounting field. He knows the importance of notes in an audit.
EXTRACT 2
Senator SHERRY—Anyway, have a look at those issues I have raised. There is another issue is relating to Westpoint. I put some questions on notice back in February and you provided me with a copy of a letter from Ian ampbell, the then parliamentary secretary, which he sent to the WA minister for consumer affairs, Mr Kobelke, on 3 February 2002 in respect of Westpoint. The letter from Senator Campbell to the minister in WA said:
Thank you for your letter of 21 August 2002 to the Treasurer concerning the use of mezzanine financing to raise funds for property development. I am responding on the Treasurer’s behalf. You would be aware that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC, especially through its Perth office, has been in regular contact with your department concerning this issue over a number of months. Further, upon receiving your letter, the Commonwealth Treasury also raised your concerns with ASIC. ASIC advised the Treasury that it is carefully examining this issue and has been obtaining comprehensive legal advice on the regulatory status of these property financing schemes to which your letter referred.
It is still not entirely clear to me, from the answers provided, exactly what ASIC was doing at that time. What were you examining back in late 2002 and early 2003 to which the parliamentary ecretary is referring?
Mr Lucy—My notes indicate that you are quite right: there was dialogue between the former Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer and the Hon. John Kobelke in Western Australia in early 2002 and also in about August-September 2002. We obtained senior counsel advice around that time as to what our jurisdictional options were, which led us to commence action in the Supreme Court of Western Australia in 2004.
Noe. The following are
statements rather questions. ASIC's behaviour is clearly anomalous in respect of the the reasonsespoused by Peter Costello for its creation.
- A clear admission by Lucy that ASIC believed it had jurisdictional problems with Westpoint as far back as 2002 and did nothing about it.
- ASIC, by its non action, clearly breached its duty of investor protection fromm 2002 to November of 2005 when Westpoint collapsed..
- Although there may have been a jurisdictional issues on promissory notes over $50,000, the real problem was ASIC's failure to reconise the Westpoint model was a Management Investment Scheme
- Lucy fails to indicate what advice ASIC received, and why it took so long to act on it.
Senator SHERRY—Wasn’t an alternative to recommend to the government to change the law to make it clear at that time? You had received warnings in 2002; you received legal advice in early 2003—
Mr Lucy—At that stage both the minister in Western Australia and ASIC separately undertook consumer warnings as to the issues regarding promissory notes greater than $50,000. Bearing in mind that the decision to deliberately carve out promissory notes greater than $50,000 was a deliberate decision taken by parliament. That position existed. At that stage, as we have said in earlier forums, the complaints which we received were to do with the jurisdictional issues; they were not to do with business plan issue or business model issues. People were not suffering financial hardship at that time through their investments.
- Are consumer warnings a legitimate substitute if a "gap" exists in the law?
-
Is the fact that the Parliament originally took a deliberate decision that placed ASIC in not being able to police the market sufficient reason for ASIC not to immediately take the matter back to parliament for a modification of the law?
- Is it reasonable that current lack of consumer complaint overide ASIC's immediate duty to ensure that "gap", which could cause massive investor losses in the future, is not rpaired at the earliest possible time? Lucy claims people were not suffering at that time. It was just put off until a later time when investor losses were even more massive.
- Although Lucy claims there had been no complaints about the business model, this whole problem arose because ASIC did not recogise the model as a MIS whenit it issued the "no action" letter to Freehills in 2000, the subject of which was promissory notes
Senator SHERRY—That you knew of.
Mr Lucy—That we knew of.
Senator SHERRY—The letter from Senator Campbell says, ‘If required, the government will consider any recommendations ASIC makes to improve consumer protection in this area.’ Did ASIC seek at that time to change the law to take clear jurisdictional control of promissory notes?
Mr Lucy—No. We took the matter to court. At that stage you do not know whether or not the law needs changing until you test it in the court.
- Do the courts make laws, or interpret them?
Senator SHERRY—You do; you can get legal advice.
Mr Lucy—We did. The legal advice was that we would be successful, and we were not fully
Senator MURRAY—If you were successful then you would not need to change the law; that is your point?
Mr Lucy—Correct. Indeed, the whole Westpoint saga would have played out quite differently.
Senator SHERRY—Wouldn’t it have been quicker to have sought to change the federal lawback in early 2003? That would have been quicker in terms of a process to cover this, wouldn’t it?
Mr Lucy—In hindsight. But again, typically, the way that parliament and the government of the day work is that it is an issue identified that is before the courts, so we wait for the courts to make it clear.
Senator SHERRY—But it was not before the courts at that moment. You apparently received advice that you did have jurisdiction—
Mr Lucy—As explained at Senate estimates, it was not clear-cut advice. It was advice that was quite complicated, it was really almost self-serving to get us to a point. Ultimately, that was not successful.
Senator SHERRY—I do not understand with respect to the activity that was occurring. If you had said to government, ‘Look, we want this matter made very clear very quickly,’ it seems to me reasonable and quite conceivable that such a change in the law would have got through the parliament by the end of 2003—it would not have been significant—and some people would have been saved a lot of grief.
Mr Lucy—Legislation cannot guarantee that there will not be failures. Parliament specifically, for whatever reason, chose to carve out the promissory notes of greater than $50,000.
Senator SHERRY—After that there were warnings coming from the WA minister, the responsible minister, and the department, a number of warnings to the Treasurer, then referred to Senator Campbell, to ASIC direct nationally and to your local office, that there was a practical problem on the ground in WA.
Mr Lucy—Yes.
Senator SHERRY—The government was considering it. The parliamentary secretary’s letter says: ‘We have received advice from you, we have received advice from Treasury, and I expect to shortly receive advice from ASIC after they have fully considered the issue.’ You were obviously considering it. The letter goes on to say:
If required, the government will consider any recommendation ASIC makes to improve consumer protection in this area.
Your preferred action was to take court action?
Mr Lucy—Correct.
- Where in the above exchange has ASIC considered the impact on investors in respect of when action should be taken?
- Why did ASIC not take the Government's offer of consideration of any recommndation to improve consumer protection in this area?
- How much investor money has been lost by ASIC's inaction? More importantly, how many people would not have suffered the trauma - financial, health wise, and a reduced lifestyle? One might also ask how many lives would have been saved by the prevention of suicides?
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13 |
Tony is sounding rather hairy-chested about his new responsibilities. Asked why it had taken three collapses for the commission to get serious about Westpoint-style schemes, he responded: "The simple answer is that I wasn’t there."[2008_05_12_Crikey]
- This is a clearacknowledgement of ASIC's prior poor performance by no less than the ASIC Chairman! The article goes on to state the ineffectiveness of ASIC in prosecuting corporate criminals. The criminal element of the financial marketplace knew ASICwould not move to protect investors.
- What specifically did Tony D'Alosio have in mind that should have been done when he uttered those words..
-
- Is it ASIC's role to protect itslf, or to protect the investing public?
- >Considering the Storm, Opes Prime, Timbercorp, Great Southern, MFS, etc., collapses since his appointment as Chairman, how effective has Tony D'Aloision been?
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14 |
In the trial of Neil Burnard witness after witness claimed Richard Beck was the architect of using Kebbel Investment Bank as an all encompassing trading names for a number of companies. Despite opposition from within Kebbel on the basis it was not legal- including the compliance officer - he ignored all advice and ordered the continuance of the practice. At the end of the trial, Neil Burnard having been found guilty on all eight charges, the Judge while waiting for an off court process to finish, said to the Prosecutor. "I presume this is the first of series of cases against senior personnel in Kebbel?" The prosecutor replied, "No we have other matters going on in WA." To date, no formal charges have been laid in this direction.[Trial Notes,
Summary, 2008_05_07_Redfern, 2008_05_23_MacAulay_Redfern),
Given that even the Judge believed the mountain of evidence in the case would mean a certain prosecution (with a possile jail sentence of up to 7 years), why has ASIC not prosecuted Richard Beck?
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A pre-trial event of some significance relates the following. In 2002, Ms Hoar’s supervisor issued directions for her to contact Kebbel Bank in relation to the use of the words boutique bank on their website. The Judge explained she couldn’t be sure to whom she spoke, because she used the de facto standard within APRA of replacing the early unimportant words at the beginning of a conversation with the word spiel. She thought it was Bernard, who blamed the website designer for the illegal use of the word "bank". As Ms Hoar wrote a full report to her superior, one cannot blame her. That record has disappeared from APRA’s records. The court rejected the evidence on two counts: she could not be sure to whom she spoke - and it was outside the period of the charges!
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Why did ASIC not know the evidence was outside the period of the charges?
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Is the use of word spiel defined in the APRA procedures manual?
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Where is the report Hoare sent to her superior?
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Did APRA pass on the information to ASIC? If not why not?
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Why did ASIC decide that APRA was the appropriate organisation to take action. Clearly, investors in the area ASIC controlled were affected. Further, if APRA was the correct regulator to take action, why did ASIC run the prosecution?
-
Why did APRA not institute a penalty?
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16 |
The trial evidence identified Richard Beck as the architect of the use of word bank. It also recorded he couldn’t be dissuaded from its use. What was not stated in the trial is that Hansard records Jeff Lucy as saying the first time ASIC heard of Kebbel Investment Bank was in April 2005 when a complaint was made to ASIC. ASIC decided it was an APRA matter and passed it on to them. In May of the same year Beck suddenly changed his mind and changed all business cards and stationery and had all reference to Kebbel Bank erased from all Kebbel Office doors across Australia. APRA sauntered out to the Kebbel NSW Offices three months after the lodging of the complaint and found no ghen current evidence of the use of the word bank. APRA took no punitive action.
- Banking may be an APRA domain, but the use of falsley claiming one is a bank in order to induce people to part with their money in ta marketplace that is clearly an ASIC responsibility.
- Why did it take APRA three months to arrive at the offices of Kebbel NSW?
- Consider the following.
- Evidence at the Burnard trial indicated Beck's defiance against all advice to use the word bank.
- ASIC received a complaint in April about "Kebbel Bank", and passed it over to APRA.
- A month late. in May Beck has a sudden change of mind and changes the name, the stationery, and erases all evidence of the words "Kebbel Bank" from all offices.
- APRA takes almost three months afte the initial complaint to arrive at The Kebbel NSW offices.
Do I have a suspicious mind, or was the timing of the above events just too "serendipitous"?
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17 |
On 2008_02_12 I wrote to the ASIC Chairman, Tony D'Aloisio asking for answers to a number of questions. Included in the letter was one relating to Karen Carey. That was the only one that received any form of answers. The other questions remain unanswered to this day.
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18 |
The background to the Karen Carey event mentioned in the previous item is as follows. ASIC took Karen Carey to Court for not producing a report as directed under law. The truth was that ASIC had seized all documents relating to the necessary company record without leaving her a copy. ASIC kept up the pressure, and on arriving at the court on the appointed date, stated they were not proceeding with the case. ASIC gave no reason for its action. The reply from Jan Redfern, ASIC's Executive Director of Enforcement does not directly answer my original question?
Why did it take ASIC so long to decide they did not have a case when they themselves had seized all records that would have allowed Karen Carey to respond to the original request.
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19 |
The document 2008_12_16_Application relates to ASIC's Section 50 involving various parties. On page 3 of the document it warns investors who sign that they will be responsible to indemnify ASIC for any loss or damage by misuse of the supplied information. This is despite ASIC not being responsible for the veracity of the information (see page 1). Given the information on this website, it is patently obvious ASIC failed Westpoint investors from the outset, and continued to fail them through its lifetime. I wrote to Ms McNally, the ASIC representative on Westpoint matters. Her reply is nothing more than a PR junket.
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20 |
During the period of the following communication exchanges with Ms McNally, I knew it was possible to sue ASIC, however, at that time I was unaware that evidence of ASIC's incompetence/negligence is not sufficient. What one has to prove is malfeasance - a very difficult thing to prove. As I have said elsewhere on the website, it is incongruent in a democratic country that a publicly funded entity does not have to obey the same rules as those it oversees. Her replies are just another example of ASIC's unwillingness to answer direct questions it might find embarrassing.
In her communication of 12_02_2009, Ms McNally claims ASIC has previously answered my questions. I claim this is a deliberate lie as ASIC has displayed a pattern of not answering questions that would bring discredit on itself. Where is the evidence ASIC answered any of them?
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21 |
ASIC convened a mediation meeting for 15/06/2009 with a view to obtaining compensation for Westpoint victims. The total sum ASIC request from the 17 defendants is $559 million. It is unlikely any business would voluntarily pay out such substantial amounts of money willingly without having done anything illegal.
As ASIC did not lay formal charges against those involved, on what basis should they pay?
Isn’t ASIC responsible for much of what has occurred?
Why is the present Government notholding ASIC to account?
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22 |
It emerged that many small investors assumed they were far better protected than they were - that a financialservices licence was some sort of guarantee of competence, and that ASIC kept a close eye on every potentially dodgy operator. Clearly, something was wrong. In August, ASIC chairman Tony D'Aloisio suggested debate was needed about the extent of investor protection. He pointed to the 1997 Wallis inquiry,which framed current financial regulations. ''If you read the Wallis inquiry, the report that underpins our whole powers, it's very clear. It says … 'we think the efficiency of the market will deliver such benefits thatoffsets the need for regulation'. Ten or 15 years later, when you've gone through what you've gone through,you say, 'Well, was that right?' [SMH article of 30/12/2009]
- Where in the legislation indicating ASIC make any reference to the Wallis Report for direction?
- Isn't it ASIC's legislated role to protect investors?
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Tony D'Aloisio's statement loses any possible credence in light of the following : "Mr. Price,the Government whip, said another property investment company Westpoint collapsed in February last year owing $300 million to its 4,000 investors, while media reports said a further 10 companies were expected to go belly-up. Yet an Auditor-General's report found 99 per cent of complaints that ASIC received had been ignored and not investigated, he said [ 9_National News_21_05_2007].
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23 |
Senator Xenophon asked Tony D'Aloisio at the Senate Estimates Committee hearing of 01/06/2010 if ASIC had commissioned an external solvency report on Westpoint. He answered, "I cannot be sure. I think there was", before taking the question on notice.
Tony D'Aloisio has met with the Westpoint Investors Group (WIG)executive on an irregular basis since 1998. On each occasion he has been well acquainted with what has occured with each of the Section 50 action relating to Westpoint. Given his contact with WIG, the nature of the action, and ASIC's exposure to another possible legal farce, Am I being being too harsh when I said I believe he must have known about the report, and its contents?
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24 |
Senator Xenophon asked Tony D'Aloisio at the Senate Estimates Committee hearing of 01/06/2010 if ASIC had commissioned an external solvency report on Westpoint. He answered, "I cannot be sure. I think there was", before taking the question on notice.
Tony D'Aloisio has met with the Westpoint Investors Group (WIG)executive on an irregular basis since 1998. On each occasion he has been well acquainted with what has occured with each of the companies in ASIC's Section 50 Westpoint action. Given his contact with WIG, the nature of the action, and ASIC's exposure to another possible legal farce, Am I being being too harsh when I said I believe he must have known about the report, and its contents? |
25 |
Mr D’Aloisio—ASIC has worked hard to recover money. We are now in the process where, I think of the $370 million or $380 million lost through liquidations and ASIC actions, investors have now received 79 somewhere in the order of $100 million [see Hansard copy, beginning line 77, Senate Estimates Committee Hearing of 01/06/2010 ].
ASIC's own website says that the total sum it sought from the 16 entitities in its Section 50 Mediation was approximately $549 million. To date (30/06/2010), there have been five successful actions. In the case involving MASU, ASIC has not disclosed the actual recovery figure. For that particular one, let us assume ASIC recovered the full , $12.5 million it sought [see MR 08-217]. The following table describes ASIC's revovery figure to 30/06/2010.
ASIC MR |
COMPANY |
AMOUNT |
08 217 |
MASU |
12,500,500.00 |
09 213AD |
PIS |
5,945,176.00 |
09 213AD |
Bongiorno |
2,559,760.00 |
09 256AD |
State Trustees |
13,500,000.00 |
10 133AD |
Glenhurst |
2,500,000.00 |
TOTAL |
|
37,004,936.00 |
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That implies the liquidators have recovered in the vicinity of $63 million if Mr. D'Aloisio's figure of $100 million is correct is correct. Of the $63 million, $49 million came from EMU Brewery (that figure arose becaue of the massive increases in land value in WA).
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It would seem to me that after 2 years of "hard work", ASIC has manged to recover less than 7% of what it seeks.
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Not all Westpoint investors will receive money from ASIC's actions. If ASIC cannot recover money from an entity, then the investors in that entity receive nothing. Further, even when ASIC is succssful, it does not mean the investors in the targetcompany will receive 100 cents in the dollar of their original investment. Victorian Estates is an example of the latter. ASIC sought $18.5 million and settled for $13.5 million. Had the target entities been prosecuted - and found guilty in a court, then investors would be entitled to a full refund of their capital, plus interest on monies lost.
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While Tony D'Aloisio has spoken of ASIC's "hard work and success", I believe by his ommissions he has misled the Senate Inquiry.
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26 |
ASIC has named KPMG as one of the 16 target parties in its Section 50 action involving Westpoint. At the heart of the matter is the quality of KPMG's audits of Westpoint companies. The current lack of publicy verifiable information in the matter damages the reputation of both ASIC and KPMG. The only matter on which both parties agree is
the 2004 audit was unqualified. The only other known fact is KPMG's claim that the notes on the eight companies indicated any concerns they held in respect of Westpoint's viability as a going concern.
- Why, in 2004, did ASIC accept unqualified accounts? Does this not prove laxity on the part of ASIC?
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ASIC has never acknowledged the veracity of KPMG's claim regaring the notes, nor have the rejected it. If KPMG's claim is true, then why did ASIC not mention the existence of the notes, and their nature, in order to give a full and informative answer to relevant questions at Senate Estimates Committees?
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